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The Rise of Secularism and the Decline of Religiosity
in Ireland: The Pattern of Religious Change in Europe
Michael J. Breen, University of Limerick, Munster, Ireland
Caillin Reynolds, University of Limerick, Munster, Ireland
Abstract: The European Values Study is a pan-European project which utilises an omnibus survey
focusing especially on values associated with work, religion, lifestyles and other issues. Its most recent
data gathering exercise was in 2008, the fourth of its kind. This study focuses on changing religious
values in Ireland over the span of the EVS (1981-2008) and examines the rise in secularism and the
rapid decrease in church participation, which brings Ireland much close to European norms. The data
to hand suggest a variety of important social questions: If religious and social values and attitudes
are changing, what are the implications for Irish society? As we become an increasingly educated
society in quantifiable terms, what is happening to our value and belief systems? Does the erosion of
church practice mean the erosion of values or are we simply witnessing transference of allegiance
from institutions to self? Some commentators suggest that reduction of care and concern for others,
a reduced sense of God, and a minimised approach to things religious, allied with a rise in liberalism,
are not of themselves harbingers of prosperity and joy for society; the opposite they contend is true,
and will result in decreased happiness and increased alienation. Is it incontrovertible that Ireland will
be different in the future, that the social map will have very different contours, especially in relation
to institutional religion. As the Irish let go of things deeply rooted in their culture and tradition, is this
simply a matter of becoming a mature nation amongst the nations of Europe?
Keywords: Religion, Europe, European Values Study, Values, Church Practice, Spirituality, Secular-
ization
Introduction
REVIEWINGTHEEUROPEANValues Study (EVS) of 1981, Fogarty et al. (1984,p.8) concluded that Ireland remains an “outstandingly religious country”. 1 Theirconclusions were based on the unparalleled levels of belief, practice and prayer that
distinguished Ireland from its European neighbours. At around the same time, Mc-
Allister (1983, p.4) described Ireland as “one of the most religious societies in the world,
by whatever measure is used”. Since then, the EVS has expanded its remit from tenWestern
European nations to forty-seven, now covering virtually all of Western and Eastern Europe,
providing an invaluable source of both cross-nationally comparable and longitudinal (i.e.
repeated cross-sectional) data.
In Ireland, the period between 1981 and 2008 was characterized by rapid and profound
economic changes, particularly from themid-1990s onwards: frommass unemployment and
emigration of the 1980s to almost full employment, inwardmigration, and a dramatic increases
1 Throughout this paper, Ireland will be used to refer to the Republic of Ireland.
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in the standard of living by the turn of the century (Kitchin and Bartley 2007).2 The period
also witnessed major political changes, most notably in relation to the cessation of the sec-
tarian conflict in Northern Ireland, and the continuing integration of Ireland into the expanding
European Union. The five constitutional referenda on the liberalization of legislation in re-
lation divorce and abortion during the period, two of which were rejected and two of which
were passed only by a slim majority, as well as the legalization of contraception and homo-
sexuality, are a testament to the volatile position of the Church as the ‘conscience of the
nation’ during this period (Kissane 2003). Commenting on some of these changes, particularly
the more liberal, secular and pluralistic character of contemporary Irish society, Kitchin and
Bartley (2007, p.14) state that Ireland today is one that is “almost unrecognizable” to the
immigrants that left in the 1980s. While there are no shortage of studies that have charted
the rise of this more secular, pluralistic, and liberal society (e.g. Hornsby-Smith 1992, Inglis
1998, Greeley and Ward 2000, Cassidy 2002, Inglis 2007b), the modest aim of this paper is
to offer a descriptive account of some of the changes pertaining to religious and social values
in this period, utilizing data from the 1981, 1990, 1999 and 2008 European Values Studies.3
The data from the EVS is unique in this respect, being the only source of a range of repeated
items relating to religious and social values and attitudes that span this thirty year period.
Furthermore, the comparative element situates these changes within wider Europe, evaluating
the extent to which Irish people have become more similar to their European neighbours, or
the extent to which Ireland remains an exceptionally religious outlier on the periphery of
Europe. As such, the longitudinal focus of this paper will concentrate on Ireland, the com-
parative on Ireland in contrast to a theoretically interesting, and geographically wide-ranging,
subset of European countries.4
Modernization, Secularization and Religious Change
Studies of religious and broader cultural changes are typically framed within a paradigm of
modernization and secularization. In very simple terms, as Bruce (2002, p.2) puts it, “mod-
ernization creates problems for religion”.5 The theory (or more precisely the thesis) of secu-
larization however, from holding a paradigmatic position in any discussion of the social and
cultural changes that accompany modernization, has received sustained criticism since at
least the 1960s (e.g. Martin 1965), the most recent theoretical affront to its status taking the
form of the “new paradigm” of ‘religious economies’, ‘supply-side’ or ‘rational choice’
2 Ireland’s economic fortunes have since witnessed a profound reversal, but the ramifications will not be discussed
here. The EVS survey of 2008 was conducted just as the ‘Celtic Tiger’ was beginning to collapse, and would
therefore seem poorly placed to make claims about the consequences for Irish values and attitudes. For a detailed
and critical discussion of the collapse, see Kirby (2010).
3 Unweighted data from European Values Study Group (2010) and European Values Study Group and World
Values Survey Association (2006) - see bibliography for file versions.
4 In regional terms the four sub-regions of Europe are represented here by Germany and France (Western), Spain
and Italy (Southern), Slovakia and Bulgaria (Eastern), Norway (Scandinavia/Northern) and Ireland (British
Isles/Northern). In most of these countries the majority religion is Roman Catholicism (Norway is predominantly
Protestant, Germany is mixed Catholic-Protestant, and Bulgaria is Eastern Orthodox).
When referring to the Church therefore, it is generally in relation to the Roman Catholic Church.
5 Modernization itself is obviously a multi-faceted concept that describes the vast array of cultural, social and
political changes that accompany socioeconomic development and the transition from traditional to industrial, and
to post-industrial society. For a more elaborate discussion Inglehart and Welzel (2005) or in relation to religion see
Bruce (2002).
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models (e.g. Bainbridge and Stark 1984, Warner 1993, Stark and Iannaccone 1994). It is
beyond the remit of this paper to discuss the theoretical merits and weaknesses of these “new
paradigm” theories, or to provide a detailed exposition of the concept and paradigm of sec-
ularization. Rather, in reflecting on some of the changes apparent in the data, the paper will
provide a brief discussion of some of the key propositions in theories of secularization and
modernization, what alternatives have been suggested, and what model seems to provide
the best fit to the patterns of religious and cultural change in Ireland over the last three dec-
ades.
Put rather simply, the paradigmatic status of secularization within the most seminal theories
of social change was one that rested on the Enlightenment-inspired conviction that belief in
the supernatural, and religion that was based on such supernatural beliefs, was destined to
disappear (or at least significantly dwindle to a very small minority) in the more rational
modern world (Casanova 1994, p.18). Again put rather plainly, the worldwide evidence
suggests that this decline simply has not happened, evidenced most significantly by the
permanence and resurgence of religion in the much of the modern world, most notably the
persistently high levels of individual religiosity in the United States (Berger 2001). The more
theoretically refined arguments within the secularization paradigm however, place increasing
unbelief and a decline in religious practice as relatively marginal aspects of the paradigm as
a whole (e.g. Dobbelaere 1999, Tschannen 1991). The central aspect is in fact the declining
societal significance of religion, which is principally linked to the increasing differentiation
of institutional spheres from religious control, and the rationalization of social organization
(seeWilson 1969, Martin 1978, Chaves 1994, Dobbelaere 1999). These broad societal trends
can be perceived in more concrete changes that affect the everyday lives of individuals in
modern society: the removal of educational institutions from ecclesiastical authority, the
separation of legal proscriptions from religious ones, and the increasing instrumentality of
relationships between role-performers in the work process (Berger 1967, Wilson 1976).
These changes no doubt alter the location and function of religion in modern society, but
whether and how this declining societal significance is causally linked to a declining preval-
ence and relevance of individual religiosity differs from theorist to theorist. Many of the
most influential theorists in the paradigm have in fact reappraised their view of this causal
connection (e.g. Berger 2001), but there are still those who vigorously defend the causal
linkage (e.g. Bruce 2002).
The apparent exception to this trend is Europe, where secularization (at both the level of
society and at the level of the individual) appears to remain the most satisfactory way of
explaining the patterns of religious change and so called “Euro-secularity” (Berger 2001,
p.447). Berger (2001, p.447) goes as far as to argue that “as a country is absorbed into Europe
economically and politically, it gets Euro-secularity along with the package”. Here too,
however, there are competing theories that stress the continuing prevalence of religious belief
and spirituality, but in ways that are divorced from the traditional institutionally bound
context. Davie’s (1990, 1994, 2000) description of “believing without belonging” in Britain
and Europe is an often cited example of this, but the more general thesis is that in modern
society religion does not simply fade away but rather changes social form. There is no dispute
that across much of post-war Europe there has been a significant decline in churchgoing,
and that this no doubt loosens the moorings of the core Christian beliefs, but the notion that
these are replaced by secular alternatives is disputed, by Davie (2001) in particular. What
social relevance these institutionally-divorced beliefs have (in relation to values and attitudes
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in particular) has however been questioned by Davie’s contemporaries (e.g. Voas and
Crockett 2005), and Davie (1994) herself has argued that her distinction between believing
and belonging is merely a useful way of capturing a mood and promoting further enquiry.
The most immediately relevant question then is to what extent does Ireland conform to this
pattern of Euro-secularity, and to what extent might believing without belonging be an ac-
curate description of the Irish case.
Religious Affiliation, Attendance and Belief
The proportion of Irish people who believe in God decreased from 97% in 1981 and 1990,
to 95.5% in 1999, and to 91.8% in 2008 (see Table 1). The proportion of individuals belonging
to a religious denomination has decreased to a similar but slightly more pronounced extent,
from 3.9% in 1990 to 11.4% in 2008. The other core Christian beliefs (life after death;
heaven; hell; sin) show similar declines of about ten percentage points in each, with belief
in Hell starting from the lowest base, and Heaven the highest. Changes in church attendance
are much more severe: weekly attendance (or more regularly) approximately halving from
82% in 1981 to 44% in 2008, this change principally occurring between the 1990 and 1999
surveys. In terms of monthly or more regular attendance (not shown), the decline is similarly
severe, from approximately 90% in 1981, to 80% in 1990, and to 65% in 2008. Furthermore,
14% of the population never attend church in 2008, from 4.5% in 1981.
Table 1
2008199919901981
91.8%95.5%97.6%97.1%God
79.8%85.3%89.5%89.3%Heaven
52.9%53.3%52.6%60.5%Hell
74.2%79.2%83.3%84.6%Afterlife
78.0%85.7%86.6%89.8%Sin
88.6%93.1%96.1%98.7%Denomination
44.3%56.9%80.9%82.4%Attendance(Weekly)
40.0%30.1%42.1%56.4%Moral Problems
32.5%27.2%35.9%52.4%Family Problems
29.8%26.7%33.3%NaSocial Problems
63.5%63.8%70.6%72.7%Spiritual Needs
7.227.417.937.88Importance of God
(Mean of 1-10)
The overall picture seems to be one of a pronounced church-oriented decline, but a relatively
persistent religious sentiment, either in terms of a more nominal denominational affiliation
that is unsubstantiated by regular practice, or in terms of persisting religious beliefs that are
unsubstantiated by regular practice.While Davie’s description of “believing without belong-
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ing” is an apt description of the latter, Inglis’s (2007a) and Demerath’s (2000) description
of “cultural Catholicism”, a loose badge of cultural identity that has tenuous connections to
belief and practice, seems a useful way of describing the former. That is not to disregard the
relevance of the 44%who attend church weekly or more regularly, and indeed the significance
of this figure becomes apparent when compared to the rest of Europe (see Table 2).
Table 2
SlovakiaBulgariaItalyNorwayGermanySpainFranceIreland
83.8%76.0%90.2%54.5%47.1%78.0%54.1%91.8%God
58.2%33.0%61.9%38.4%25.5%47.4%32.8%79.8%Heaven
49.8%28.6%51.5%15.5%13.6%31.4%16.9%52.9%Hell
66.1%31.6%71.2%45.8%31.2%49.9%42.7%74.2%Afterlife
71.4%63.9%57.2%30.7%35.8%48.9%40.4%78.0%Sin
80.3%74.6%80.6%79.0%53.9%75.9%51.2%88.6%Denom.
40.0%5.6%32.0%5.3%6.4%18.5%6.7%44.3%Attend
62.4%41.1%55.6%32.1%38.8%33.7%31.8%40.0%Moral
53.9%25.7%45.6%21.0%30.9%30.9%27.6%32.5%Family
33.3%13.9%39.2%17.0%25.6%26.3%22.3%29.8%Social
79.3%57.6%76.7%50.2%42.3%46.0%55.9%63.5%Spirit
6.975.877.194.194.095.84.317.22Imp
God
Of the subset of European countries used here, only Slovakia approaches the level of attend-
ance in Ireland. Other interesting comparisons such as Italy are over ten percentage points
below. In terms of core Christian beliefs, Ireland ranks considerably higher than all the
countries on most, and on a par with Italy and Slovakia in relation to some. With regard to
denominational affiliation, Ireland again ranks highest, but other European countries have
similar proportions.
Some further substantiation of these figures, particularly the belief aspect, can be gained
from looking at the level of importance individuals assign to such beliefs, specifically the
question relating to the ‘Importance of God in your life’, of which the mean values are
presented in Table 1.6What is noteworthy is that in Ireland the mean levels on this item have
changed only very slightly over the past three decades, from a mean of 7.88 in 1981 to 7.22
in 2008. It suggests that despite the quite substantial decline in religious practice, this does
not entail an indifference or apathy towards religious belief. In fact, it requires no further
interpretation: God is almost as subjectively important to individuals in Ireland today as in
the early 1980s. If one were to take such subjective importance as an index of secularization
(and in many ways it is an important index in that it gains an insight into the personal
6 Individuals were asked to rank on a ten-point scale, where one is not at all important and ten is very important,
‘How important is God in your life?’.
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meaning individuals attach to their religious beliefs), then one could not say with great
confidence that Irish people have become a great deal more secular since the 1980s. In
European comparison (see Table 2), Ireland unsurprisingly ranks highest, but the means in
Italy and Slovakia are not appreciably different. France, Germany and Norway on the other
hand have considerably lower averages.
A similar battery of items in the EVS questionnaire, that asks individuals about the import-
ance of religion in their lives, and the importance of other activities, offers further insight
into this topic.7 The mean values of each activity (with a lower score indicating greater im-
portance), in European comparison are presented in Figure 1. Firstly, one can examine the
relative importance of each activity: on average Irish people see family as most important,
followed by friends, leisure time, work, religion and lastly politics. In Ireland, this ordering
has not changed that drastically since 1990, with family permanently the most important,
but work and religion have each moved down in the rankings at the expense of leisure time
(not shown). Comparing these averages to those in Europe however, Ireland still ranks very
highly in terms of the importance of religion, behind only Italy. There appears to be a high
degree of consensus in Europe on the importance of the family, and also a degree of consensus
that religion and politics are relatively less important. And while the importance of religion
and politics occupy the lowest positions in every country, it appears that these are the two
areas where European countries differ most.
Figure 1
7 Individuals are asked “please say, for each of the following, how important it is in your life”, (with importance
ranked on a four-point scale of: very important, quite important, not important, not at all important) in the categories
religion, work, family, friends, leisure time. It should be noted that these are six separate questions- individual do
not themselves order each of these activities in terms of importance. These questions were not asked in the Irish
1981 survey.
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To briefly summarize this section on individual indicators of religiosity, the Irish pattern is
one of declining core beliefs, a more pronounced decline in practice, but still remaining
“outstandingly religious” compared to much of Europe. The decline, particularly in relation
to practice, suggests the applicability of secularization, and “Euro-secularity” as a suitable
explanation and description of these patterns of religious change. And while “believing
without belonging” appears to be a relatively useful way of partially describing the resistance
of the Irish case to these secular trends, the proportion who belong and believe, who practice
regularly and accept all the core Christian beliefs, seems to distinguish the Irish case from
the pattern in much of Europe. Despite the decline in practice, the subjective importance Irish
people attribute to God in their lives seems to underline the non-triviality of the relative
permanence of these religious beliefs. The important qualification in this regard is that Irish
people, in a pattern that is broadly similar across Europe, view family, friends, work and
leisure time as more important than religion.
Moral, Social, Family and Spiritual Answers
As stated earlier, the more theoretically sophisticated versions of secularization treat a decline
in belief and practice as relatively marginal to the paradigm as a whole (Dobbelaere 1999,
Tschannen 1991). What is central to the secularization paradigm is the societal significance
of religion (Wilson 1976, Dobbelaere 1999). With functional differentiation, religion is no
longer the sole source of values in society, or no longer is society integrated on the basis of
a religious worldview. Rather, individuals now move between different institutional spheres
each guided by their own autonomous values and norms. Religion becomes privatized, a
matter of personal choice and preference that no longer permeates other social spheres
(Luckmann 1990). A somewhat useful insight into the effects of this process at the individual
level is in terms of the extent to which individuals feel the Church is providing adequate
answers to certain problems- moral, social, family life- and spiritual needs. One would expect
that as society becomes increasingly differentiated, the spheres in which the Church is seen
to be providing adequate answers will becomemore restricted, replaced by more specialized
institutions and specialized forms of knowledge. Examples might include the recommenda-
tions of social science replacing the social teachings of the Church, or family life problems
becoming the domain of psychologists and counsellors rather than local clergy.
Spiritual needs, being essentially located in the ‘religious sphere’, would seem to be more
immune to these changes. Since however the question is in relation to the ‘Church answers’,
one should be mindful that it is proposed that the privatization of religion (that religion is
now a preference rather than an obligation) gives rise to an increasing pluralism in the reli-
gious/spiritual sphere itself, whether in the form of semi-institutionalized New Religious
Movements, or in terms of the private syncretism of various magical, (quasi)scientific,
philosophical and other religious sources (Luckmann 1990). In Luckmann’s (1967, p.135,
1990) work, this new syncretic religion, characterized by a “sacralization of subjectivity”,
is in the new modern social form of religion, its ascension to some extent at the expense of
the traditional Christian churches. As such, one might expect that the Church would not be
completely immune to a decline in its credibility in relation to spiritual matters. One must
also be mindful of the more proximate causes of declining credibility in addition to these
societal trends, the series of clerical sexual abuse scandals of the mid-1990s in particular.
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While one could fit these incidents into a broader theoretical discussion of secularization8,
suffice it to say here that such scandals will have undermined the credibility of the Church
to be officious on certainmatters, perhapsmorality in particular (For a discussion of the effects
on public opinion of media coverage and the official govt. reports on abuse, see Breen et al.
2009, Crowe 2008).
In 2008, approximately two-thirds of the Irish population feel that the Church is providing
adequate answers to people’s spiritual needs (See Table 1). The decline in this proportion
since 1981 is of a similar magnitude to the declines in relation to the core Christian beliefs,
and of denominational affiliation, approximately 10 percentage points in each. In relation
to moral, social, and family life problems, those who feel the Church is providing adequate
answers are of a much smaller proportion, with family life and social problems standing at
around 30%, and moral problems at 40%. In relation to moral and family life problems, this
2008 figure represents a decline of 15-20 percentage points in each since 1981, although
there appears to have been a slight rebound in each between 1999 and 2008. Unsurprisingly,
these declines seem to be broadly reflective of the decline in religious practice. It would
appear that those who have ceased practicing regularly have also become sceptical of the
answers the Church provides on these issues.
The difference between Ireland and Europe on these items is not nearly as great as the
differences in levels of belief and practice (See Table 2). Italy and Slovakia for instance,
have higher proportions who feel the Church is giving answers to moral, family, social and
spiritual problems. The proportions in Ireland are in fact more similar to Germany in relation
to moral, social and family life problems, albeit differing in relation to spiritual needs. One
might very tentatively suggest that there may be more room for the alternative expressions
of spirituality in Germany (beingmore pluralistic, and also more secular), but that alternatives
in terms of moral, social and family problems have similarly displaced the position of the
Churches in both these countries. Such conclusions may be stretching the data a little too
far, suggesting that the Church decline on these issues automatically entails the ascension
of alternative agencies that provides adequate answers. Although it is not directly comparable,
further insight on this can be gained by looking at changing levels of confidence in a selection
of social institutions.
Confidence in Institutions
Figure 2 shows the proportion of individuals in Ireland who declared they had “a great deal
of confidence” in a selection of social institutions from 1981 to 2008.9What is immediately
striking is that confidence in the Church is only marginally surpassed by the education system,
on a par with the armed forces, and marginally ahead of the police. The justice system, par-
liament, and the press all rank considerably lower. That is not to understate the considerable
fall in robust Church confidence, from over half the population in 1981 to just over 20% in
2008. These declines are mirrored (from a lower base) in all but the education system. Clearly
8 The collapse of the worldview, one of the exemplars of Tschannen’s (1991) systematization of the secularization
paradigm would be the point of departure here. Berger’s (1967, pp. 78-80) ideas on the collapse of the Christian
theodicy in times of great crisis would seem an interesting theoretical parallel, but would require a much broader
discussion.
9 Individuals are asked to select from four options how much confidence they have a particular institution: a great
deal; quite a lot; not very much; or none at all.
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lack of confidence is a more important indicator of the institutional health of the Church
than it would be in the case of the armed forces, but the decline in confidence across almost
all of these institutions suggest something broader than secularization is at work.
Figure 2
As part of his vast body of work on the effects of modernization on cross-national value
change among the mass publics of industrial and post-industrial societies (e.g. Inglehart
1997a, Inglehart 2003, Inglehart and Welzel 2005, Norris and Inglehart 2004), Inglehart
(1997b) has suggested that postmodernization entails a decreasing confidence in the more
authoritarian and hierarchical institutions of society (e.g. the army, the police, the church)10.
Instead there is an emphasis on the self, and on personal autonomy in particular. It is beyond
the remit of this paper to engage in a detailed comparative analysis of this anti-authoritarian
vs. personally autonomous axis, but some insight may be gained through European compar-
ison, in which the countries are predominantly post-industrial.11 While there is universal
lack of confidence in the press and parliament, and to a lesser extent the justice system, there
appears to be no clear pattern of anti-authoritarian attitudes across all institutions. In the
Slovak Republic for example, high levels of confidence in the Church are accompanied by
low levels of confidence in the police, and the opposite is true of Norway. Although one
cannot make claims about the extent of decline in confidence in these countries with the data
presented here, the only immediately discernible pattern is that those countries that have the
highest levels of belief and practice- Ireland, Italy, Slovakia- have the highest levels of
10 Inglehart (1997b) in fact links declining confidence in the church to the process of modernization rather than
postmodernization, but one can assumed that its status will not change in the postmodern/post-industrial transition.
11 Bulgaria and Slovakia are defined by Norris and Inglehart (2004, p.244) as industrial rather than post-industrial,
or modern rather than postmodern.
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confidence in the Church, and those who have the lowest levels of belief and practice have
the lowest level of confidence (but even for this trend to hold one has to exclude Bulgaria).
Table 3
SlovakiaBulgariaItalyNorwayGermanySpainFranceIreland
2.262.662.192.652.892.872.762.34Church
2.492.872.11.982.22.232.172.15Police
2.242.682.12.412.462.442.192.1Army
2.142.652.412.222.562.162.122.06Education
2.823.242.772.12.492.642.472.59Justice
2.573.392.822.322.822.572.572.57Parliament
2.762.962.852.622.882.722.762.64Press
Tolerance
An additional aspect of Inglehart’s modernization theory is that increasing socioeconomic
development is accompanied by increased tolerance, trust and personal autonomy, all of
which form part of a development sequence that characterizes the movement from industrial
to post-industrial societies (Inglehart andWelzel 2005). Inglehart’s broad thesis is “socioeco-
nomic development giving rise to a new type of society that promotes human emancipation”
(Inglehart and Welzel 2005, p.2). This does not seem to have been the case in Ireland.
Table 4
2008199919901981
77.4%66.1%64.4%Drug Addicts
65.9%55.6%51.7%43.9%Criminal Record
41.7%36.3%34.1%33.3%Heavy Drinkers
34.2%24.9%30.0%22.8%Emotionally Unstable
28.2%22.8%34.6%Aids
22.7%13.5%13.6%13.4%Muslims
19.1%26.8%33.2%Homosexuals
14.1%12.3%5.1%5.8%
Immigrants/Foreign
Workers
10.9%10.9%6.4%Jews
10.0%12.1%5.9%7.2%Different Race
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Overall, Irish people have become more intolerant since the 1980s (see Table 4). 12 They
are proportionally more intolerant of drug addicts, people with a criminal record, heavy
drinkers, emotionally unstable people, Muslims, immigrants/foreign workers, Jews and
people of a different race. On the other hand, they have becomemore tolerant of homosexuals
and people with AIDS. Compared to Europe, Ireland has higher proportions of intolerance
towardmost groups than France, Spain, and Norway, and quite similar levels to Italy, Bulgaria
and Slovakia. Slovakia and Bulgaria, being defined as industrial countries, would seem to
fit Inglehart’s model, as do the post-industrial countries of France, Spain and Norway. Italy
and Ireland, both post-industrial, do not. Perhaps high levels of allegiance to an authoritarian
Church would explain this conflict, but the declines in Church confidence in Ireland that
have coincided with increasing intolerance would seem to negate this argument. One probable
cause of this disparity is that Inglehart generally uses levels of tolerance towards homosexu-
ality in his operationalization of “tolerance of others’ liberty” (Inglehart and Welzel 2005,
p.150). If this operationalization is applied, then Ireland (but perhaps not Italy) would fit
Inglehart’s model. This narrow view of tolerance however, may only serve to obscure the
possible negative aspects of socioeconomic development. Such a perspective is reflected in
Loyal’s (2003) critical discussion of Ireland’s most recent phase of rapid development, in
relation to increased racism and intolerance of immigrants in particular.
Underlying the celebrated liberal values of freedom, choice and opportunity, which are
supposedly intrinsic to the cultural renewal ushered in by the ‘new Ireland’, is the harsh
reality of capitalist production, exclusionary nationalism and growing xenophobia, in
relation to both the state and the general populace.
(Loyal 2003, p.74)
While tolerance of homosexuality is congruent with the liberal values of the ‘new Ireland’,
increasing intolerance of almost all groups does indeed suggest a harsh reality that is obscured
in narratives of modernization and cultural development.
Table 5
SlovakBulgariaItalyNorwayGermanySpainFranceIreland
76.8%84.1%59.1%52.2%67.5%46.7%39.6%77.4%Drug
69.4%78.4%52.3%34.2%30.0%34.0%14.5%65.9%Criminal
72.9%80.9%45.0%25.3%59.9%31.4%35.8%41.7%Drinkers
23.6%76.3%39.4%29.6%13.9%20.4%12.2%34.2%Emotion
40.2%45.8%29.9%5.3%16.4%12.3%2.7%28.2%Aids
23.1%19.5%22.7%13.3%26.2%12.9%7.6%22.7%Muslims
34.1%54.9%21.7%5.6%17.1%5.4%5.7%19.1%Homo
12 Tolerance/Intolerance measured as response to the question: “On this list are various groups of people could you
please sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbours”. For an example of where this measure of intol-
erance/prejudice has been applied see Strabac and Listhaug (2008).
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16.6%18.1%16.1%6.0%11.6%4.2%4.3%14.1%Immig
12.5%14.9%12.1%2.9%6.1%2.5%2.4%10.9%Jews
15.4%21.2%15.6%5.1%4.6%4.0%3.4%10.9%Race
Moral Values
How religion informs and influences moral values is obviously a complex interplay between
individuals, institutions, and society. In the classical sociological theories, pre-modern society
is one in which religion is the social cement that binds individuals to the moral community,
objectifying its values and legitimating social control through reference to a sacred and su-
pernatural authority (Durkheim 1976). With functional differentiation, society is no longer
integrated on the basis of an all-encompassing religious worldview. As described earlier,
individuals nowmove between relatively autonomous institutions with their own specialized
values and norms (Luckmann 1990). Social control and cohesion shifts from moral suasion
to technical imperatives, enshrined in constitutions, laws and various other technical devices
(Wilson 1976, pp. 267-268). Of course, this operates differently in dissimilar historical
contexts and in relation to different religious institutions (see Casanova 1994, Martin 2005).
From at least the nineteenth century to at least the 1960s, the Catholic Church in Ireland
occupied a dominant position in controlling the moral values of Irish Catholics (Inglis 1998,
pp.20-24). Through a vast organisational apparatus that permeated schools, hospitals, homes,
as well as churches, the Catholic Church ensured knowledge of, and adherence to, their rules
and regulations (see Inglis 1998, pp.39-64). A detailed discussion of the declining reach of
this apparatus is beyond the scope of this paper, but from the evidence already presented,
one would expect that with declining institutionally-oriented religiosity, in terms of declining
levels of practice, confidence in the Church, and declining Church adequacy in terms of
moral, social and family life problems, that there would be a significant shift in moral values
away from the social teachings of the Church. Even with the continuing prevalence of belief,
one of the central ideas in theories of secularization is that, in modern society, they are no
longer socially significant. At the individual level this is manifest in the extent to which in-
dividuals consign their religious views to the private domain, and the extent that their religious
views no longer inform aspects of their lives in other domains. Religiosity becomes compart-
mentalized – something that is only relevant in its own particular time and place – no longer
informing aspects of everyday lives to the same extent as it once did (Bruce 2002, pp.19-
21). 13
The question of interest in the EVS here is one in which individuals are asked to rank on
a ten-point scale whether an action is one, never justified, or ten, always justified. The
changing mean values for each action from 1981-2008 are represented in Figure 3. In order
of the magnitude of change, Irish people have on average, become more liberal in relation
to homosexuality, divorce, euthanasia, and abortion since 1981. In relation to suicide and
13 This is one of the major criticisms, alluded to earlier, levelled at the “believing without belong” thesis as an al-
ternative to secularization theories. For instance, Voas &Crockett (2005) question what social relevance have beliefs
that are unsubstantiated by practice. That is, beliefs that are unsubstantiated in other spheres of activity do actually
fit quite well within the secularization paradigm.
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adultery the trend is one of relative stability since 1981.14 It is no accident that the changes
in relation to homosexuality and divorce are reflective of the legal changes witnessed in the
mid 1990s. One could describe such changes as the increasing secularization of Irish society,
where Church proscriptions have become separate from legal ones. One might also argue
that the continuing illegality of abortion and euthanasia in Ireland reflects a certain resistance
to these trends. While one must be mindful that they are not completely democratic, legal
changes also reflect the views and demands of individual and groups to alter what is officially
sanctioned (Abela 2001). The increasing justifiability of euthanasia and abortion, now oc-
cupying the middle of the spectrum, seem particularly interesting in this regard, but the
persistent conservatism in attitudes towards suicide and adultery are also noteworthy. It
seems to suggest that Irish people increasingly pick and choose which social teachings they
adhere to and which they do not. That is not to say that the only reason an individual might
oppose abortion or suicide is because of their allegiance to the Catholic Church, but that the
changes in these attitudes depict a society that increasingly no longer accepts unquestionably
many of the core social teachings of the Church.
Figure 3
An insight into this claim can be seen in a comparison of the changing attitudes to abortion
and homosexuality among regular and irregular churchgoers. Figure 4 shows the change in
14 In relation to suicide and adultery the trend is in fact towards increasing liberalism, but the mean differences
between 1981 and 2008 are not significant in relation to adultery, and the mean differences between 1990 and 2008
are not significant in relation to suicide (t-tests not shown).
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justifiability of abortion and homosexuality according to two groups, one who attend church
monthly or more, and the other less so (including never). The mean differences between the
two attendance groups are immediately apparent, with the scale of the difference between
the two groups roughly equivalent for each issue. Furthermore, the difference between the
two groups has not changed much over time. Although attendance is no doubt reflective of
other social-structural variable such as age and education, it does not lend much credence
to the notion that individual religiosity (in terms of attendance) has become irrelevant in at
least differentiating between groups who hold divergent moral values. The similar trajectories
of change in both groups however, in relation to homosexuality in particular, and to a lesser
degree in relation to abortion, imply that it is not simply changes in institutionally-oriented
religiosity that have contributed to the more liberal outlook of Irish people, but that religious
and non-religious alike have become more liberal. In this sense, it is not merely declines in
regular practice that have contributed to a growing liberalism, but that even those who attend
regularly seem to be subject to the same liberalizing social currents as those who do not.
Figure 4
In comparison to Europe (see Table 6), Ireland remains exceptionally conservative in relation
to most of these issues, but with the notable exception in relation to homosexuality. Ireland
is comfortably the most conservative nation in relation to abortion, euthanasia, and to a
lesser extent adultery. In relation to suicide it is still comparatively quite conservative, quite
similar to Italy and Spain, but Bulgaria is the most conservative, and there is a similar pattern
in relation to divorce. Homosexuality is the rather large exception. On this issue Ireland, and
to a lesser extent Slovakia, seem to be more similar to countries such as France, Spain and
Germany, as opposed to the more conservative Italy and Bulgaria. Aside from this issue, the
overall pattern is one of the most highly religious countries having the most conservative
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moral values. One point of interest is that despite Ireland being closer to countries like Ger-
many or Spain rather than Italy or Slovakia in terms of whether the Church is providing an-
swers to social, moral and family life problems, it remains closer to the latter group in terms
of conservatism on these moral issues. One might surmise that this general conservatism is
so deeply embedded in Irish culture (and for some issues, ingrained in law), that to uproot
it may take longer and require more effort than to simply denounce the influence of the
Church.
Table 6
SlovakBulgarItalyNorwayGermanySpainFranceIreland
4.034.633.596.374.754.85.973.14Abortion
5.035.054.817.056.246.886.545.23Divorce
4.174.244.635.714.675.996.743.73Euthan
2.971.662.293.363.382.554.312.32Suicide
4.792.783.797.185.696.015.655.2Homo
2.792.292.282.122.792.223.142.02Adultery
Conclusions and Reflections
Despite the declines in institutionally-oriented religiosity and the lesser declines in beliefs,
Ireland remains an outstandingly religious country. The important question is whether this
relative persistence represents something unusual about Ireland in particular, or whether Irish
society is simply in a process of ‘catching up’ to the rest of Europe. Most commentators
propose the link between national identity and Catholicism, particularly in its role as an op-
position to foreign domination, as the primary explanation the unusually high levels of reli-
giosity in both Northern Ireland and the Republic (e.g. Bruce 2002, Martin 2005). Indeed
Martin (1978, p.107) goes as far as to suggest that there is an “indissoluble union between
church and nation” when religion and national culture become so intertwined. In his typology
of Catholic identity in modern Ireland, Inglis (2007a) describes a modern variant of this
sense of group identity that remains tied up with Catholicism: that of the “cultural Catholic”.
While it may not be explicitly entangled with a defensive nationalism, it is bound to a sense
of shared heritage a distinct cultural identity. Inglis (2007a) argues that being Catholic has
become less about adhering to rules and regulations, but that it still retains a sense of belonging
and bonding to a community, and to a shared heritage. That is not to disregard the quite
substantial proportion of the population who attend regularly and unquestionably accept the
rules and regulations of the Church. But it would seem that even with these comparatively
high levels of practice, the needs of many Irish Catholics have shifted away from requiring
guidance on moral, social and family life issues. The declining confidence in the Church,
and the move away from its social teachings, add further weight to the inference that the
Church is increasingly relegated to its specifically religious sphere of activity and influence.
The relative persistence of belief and the subjective importance of God would suggest that
even in the modern Irish society, these more spiritual aspects of life are still important, and
that the spiritual needs of Irish people still have a resonance with the Church. The declining
confidence in nearly all social institutions and the growing intolerance of various groups
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suggest the need for some form of integration that might offset the negative and individual-
izing effects of modernity. Whether the Catholic Church can provide such integration, as a
symbol of shared heritage and community, or as an institution whose relevance is becoming
more limited to spiritual matters, remains to be seen.
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